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Farhad Farokhi
Abstract— We consider privacy against hypothesis-testing
adversaries within a non-stochastic framework. We develop a
theory of non-stochastic hypothesis testing by borrowing the
notion of uncertain variables from non-stochastic information
theory. We define tests as binary-valued mappings on uncertain
variables and prove a fundamental bound on the performance
of tests in non-stochastic hypothesis testing. We use this bound
to develop a measure of privacy. We then construct reporting
policies with prescribed privacy and utility guarantees. The
utility of a reporting policy is measured by the distance
between reported and original values. We illustrate the effects
of using such privacy-preserving reporting polices on a publicly-
available practical dataset of preferences and demographics of
young individuals with Slovakian nationality.
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, stochastic policies have been used for privacy
protection [1]. More recently, stochastic policies with prov-
able privacy guarantees have been developed using differ-
ential privacy [2]–[6] and information-theoretic privacy [7]–
[15]. Differential privacy uses randomization to ensure that
the statistics of reported outputs do not change noticeably by
variations in an individual entry of the dataset. This is often
ensured by the use of additive Laplace or Gaussian noise with
a scale proportional to the sensitivity of reports on a private
dataset with respect to an individual entry. Information-
theoretic privacy, dating back to the secrecy problem [16],
emphasizes on masking or equivocating of information from
the intended primary receiver or a secondary receiver with
as much information as the primary receiver (e.g., an eaves-
dropper) while providing guarantees on utility by bounding
distortion, i.e., the distance between obfuscated and original
reports [14], [17]–[19] .
Although the above-mentioned stochastic policies provide
provable privacy guarantees, many organizations still use de-
terministic heuristic-based privacy-preserving methods, such
as k-anonymity [20], [21] and `-diversity [22]. For instance,
anonymization is frequently used by governments1 or compa-
nies2 alike for releasing private data to the broader public for
analysis even though it is proved to be insufficient for privacy
preservation [23]–[25]. Other policies, such as k-anonymity,
are also vulnerable to attacks [22], [26].
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The popularity of non-stochastic/deterministic privacy-
preserving policies is perhaps caused by factors, such as
undesirable properties of differentially-private additive noise
especially Laplace noise [27], [28], simplicity of implement-
ing deterministic policies (in the sense of not requiring exper-
tise in probability theory) [29], and generation of unreason-
able/unrealistic outputs by the use of randomness [30]–[32].
The guarantees of information-theoretic privacy are also most
often presented in the form of averages, i.e., bounds on the
average amount of leaked information. Information-theoretic
privacy also requires the knowledge of the probability distri-
bution of private dataset, which might not be available at the
time of design or might change over time. These observations
motivate the need for better understanding of non-stochastic
privacy policies.
Absence of systematic methods for developing or assess-
ing deterministic privacy-preserving policies is due to the
lack of privacy measures for deterministic policies on non-
stochastic arbitrary datasets. This makes proving privacy
guarantees for deterministic policies, in any sense, even if
weak or limited in scope or practice, impossible. Recently,
non-stochastic information theory (see, e.g., [33]–[40]) was
used to develop a deterministic measure of privacy in [26].
This measure was successfully utilized to show that binning,
a popular deterministic policy for privacy preservation, pro-
vides some guarantees, and to prove that k-anonymity is in
fact not privacy preserving, without resorting to extensive
simulations and numerical studies (which are only sufficient
and not necessary in the analysis of general policies). The
privacy measure in [26] is perfect for providing protections
against generic adversaries; however, in some instances,
more might be known about the privacy-intrusive adversaries,
hence the privacy measure can be further refined.
A category of adversaries studied in privacy literature is
the category of hypothesis testing adversaries [4], [12], [41].
Such an adversary is interested in examining the validity of a
hypothesis, e.g., if a house is occupied or if an individual has
a certain disease based on some reports. The privacy risk, in
this case, is often measured by the minimum error probability
of the adversary. In this paper, we expand this analysis to a
non-stochastic framework. To do so, we develop a theory of
non-stochastic hypothesis testing by borrowing the concept
of uncertain variables from non-stochastic information the-
ory. Uncertain variables only consider support sets and do not
assign distributions/measures to variables. In non-stochastic
hypothesis theory, we define tests as binary-valued functions
on uncertain variables. We prove a fundamental bound for
the performance of tests. This bound is used to develop a
measure of privacy. We then construct reporting functions
with given privacy and utility guarantees. We illustrate the
outcomes of using such privacy-preserving polices on prac-
tical datasets.
The rest of the paper organized as follows. We present the
non-stochastic hypothesis testing framework in Section II.
In Section III, we investigate privacy against hypothesis-
testing adversaries. Finally, we present numerical results in
Section IV and conclude the paper in Section V.
II. NON-STOCHASTIC HYPOTHESIS TESTING
In this section, we develop a framework for non-stochastic
hypothesis testing starting by introducing the notion of
uncertain variables.
A. Uncertain Variables
Consider sample space Ω whose elements ω ∈ Ω are the
source of uncertainty. An uncertain variable is a mapping
defined over Ω, such as X : Ω→ X, with X(ω) denoting a
realization of the uncertain variable. When the dependence
of the uncertain variable, or in short u.v., to the sample is
evident from the context, X(ω) is replaced by X . In this
paper, we restrict ourselves to real-valued uncertain variables,
e.g., X ⊆ Rnx for some integer nx ≥ 0. Marginal range of
any uncertain variable X is JXK := {X(ω) : ω ∈ Ω} ⊆ X.
Joint range of any two uncertain variables X : Ω → X
and Y : Ω → Y is JX,Y K := {(X(ω), Y (ω)) : ω ∈
Ω} ⊆ X×Y. Conditional range of any uncertain variable X ,
conditioned on the realization of another uncertain variable
Y (ω) = y, is JX|yK := {X(ω) : ∃ω ∈ Ω such that Y (ω) =
y} ⊆ JXK. Uncertain variables (Xi)ni=1 are unrelated if
JX1, . . . , XnK = JX1K × · · · × JXnK. Further, they are
conditionally unrelated, conditioned on uncertain variable Y ,
if JX1, . . . , Xn|yK = JX1|yK×· · ·× JXn|yK for all y ∈ JY K.
For two uncertain variables, X1 and X2 are unrelated if
JX1|x2K = JX1K,∀x2 ∈ JX2K.
An uncertain variable X for which JXK is uncountably
infinite is a continuous uncertain variable, similar to a
continuous random variable. An uncertain variable X for
which JXK is finite is a discrete uncertain variable. Non-
stochastic entropy of a continuous uncertain variable X can
be defined as
h0(X) := loge(µ(JXK)) ∈ R ∪ {±∞}, (1)
where µ is the Lebesgue measure. While the logarithm
can be taken in any basis, it is in the natural basis in
this paper following the literature on differential entropy
of continuous random variables. The non-stochastic entropy
in (1) is sometimes referred to as Rényi differential 0-
entropy [36]. Non-stochastic entropy of a discrete uncertain
variable X can be defined as
H0(X) := log2(|JXK|) ∈ R, (2)
where | · | is the cardinality of a set. In this paper, for discrete
uncertain variables, in line with the literature on entropy of
discrete random variables, the logarithm is in the basis of
two.
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Fig. 1. Relationship between uncertain variables in non-stochastic hypoth-
esis testing based on uncertain measurements.
B. Hypothesis Testing Based on Uncertain Measurements
Consider three uncertain variables in Figure 1. Uncertain
variable X denotes an original uncertain variable. We have
access to an uncertain measurement of this variable denoted
by Y . This is captured by that Y = gY (X) for a mapping
gY : JXK → JY K. Recalling that uncertain variables are
mappings from the sample space, it must be that Y = gY ◦X .
Similarly, we may define the hypothesis as an uncertain vari-
able H with binary range JHK = {p0, p1}, where p0 denotes
the null hypothesis and p1 denotes the alternative hypothesis.
We assume that there exists a mapping gH : JXK → JHK
such that H = gH ◦X; the hypothesis is constructed based
on the uncertain variable X as H = gH(X). Note that Y
and H are conditionally unrelated, conditioned on uncertain
variable X .
A test is a function T : JY K → JHK = {p0, p1}. If
T (Y ) = p1, the test rejects the null hypothesis in favour
of the alternative hypothesis; however, if T (Y ) = p0, the
test accepts the null hypothesis. The set of all tests is given
by JHKJY K, which captures the set of all functions from JY K
to JHK.
Consider y ∈ JY K such that T (y) = p0; the null hypothesis
is accepted. The realization of output Y (ω) = y may
correspond to many realizations of uncertain variable X , i.e.,
all the elements of the set JX|yK. We say that T (y) = p0
is correct, or the test is correct for the output realization
Y (ω) = y, if gH(x) = p0 for all x ∈ JX|yK, i.e., all
realizations of uncertain variable X compatible with y that
are also compatible with the null hypothesis. The same holds
for the alternative hypothesis as well. In following definition,
we use the notation that JH|JX|yKK := {h ∈ JH|xK : x ∈
JX|yK} = ∪x∈JX|yKJH|xK.
Definition 1 (Correctness): A test T ∈ JHKJY K is correct
at y ∈ JY K if JH|JX|yKK = {T (y)}. The set of all outputs for
which the test is correct is ℵ(T ) := {y ∈ JY K : JH|JX|yKK =
{T (y)}}. C
Based on this definition of correctness, we can define a
performance measure for a test:
P(T ) :=
{
loge(µ(ℵ)), Y is a continuous u.v.
log2(|ℵ|), Y is a discrete u.v.
(3)
We seek an optimal hypothesis test using the optimization
problem in
T ∗ ∈ arg max
T∈JHKJY K
P(T ). (4)
Definition 2 (Consistency): A test T : JY K → JHK is
consistent if (i) T (Y ) = p0 only if Y ∈ JY |p0K and (ii)
T (Y ) = p1 only if Y ∈ JY |p1K. C
In the following theorem, we prove that consistent tests are
in fact optimal in the sense of P . For any mapping g : x 7→ y,
we define the inverse image g−1(y) := {x : g(x) = y}.
Theorem 1: (Optimal Tests): Any consistent test is a so-
lution of (4). C
Proof: The proofs are removed due to page limits.
See [42] for the complete proofs.
Note that if the realization of the lossy/uncertain measure-
ment Y belongs to JY |p0K∩JY |p1K, there is not enough evi-
dence to accept or reject the null hypothesis or the alternative
hypothesis. However, if the realization of the measurement
Y belongs to (JY |p0K \ JY |p1K) ∪ (JY |p1K \ JY |h2K) =
JY |p0K∆JY |p1K, with ∆ denoting the symmetric difference
operator on the sets, we can confidently reject or accept the
null hypothesis or the alternative hypothesis. This fact is used
by the consistent tests to achieve the highest performance.
Theorem 2: (Performance Bound): The performance of
any test T ∈ JHKJY K is upper bounded as
P(T )≤
{
loge(µ(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K)), Y is a continuous u.v.
log2(|JY |p0K∆JY |p1K|), Y is a discrete u.v.
C
Proof: The upper bound in the statement of the theorem
follows from the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 can be seen as a non-stochastic equiv-
alent of the Chernoff-Stein Lemma (see, e.g., [43,
Ch. 11] for randomized hypothesis testing). Note that
loge(µ(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K)) essentially captures the difference
between the ranges JY |p0K and JY |p1K resembling the
Kullback–Leibler divergence in a non-stochastic frame-
work. A same interpretation can also be provided for
log2(|JY |p0K∆JY |p1K|).
Example 1: (Hypothesis Testing Using Noisy Measure-
ments): Consider an uncertain variable X = (X1, X2) ∈
[100, 250] × [−10, 10], where X1 denotes the height of an
individual in centimetres and X2 denotes the measurement
error in centimetres. The uncertain measurement is Y =
gY (X) = X1+X2. Further, the hypothesis uncertain variable
is defined as H = gH(X) = p01X1≤150 + p11X1>150.
The null hypothesis p0 is that the individual’s is short (i.e.,
shorter than or equal to 150 centimetres) and the alternative
hypothesis is that the individual is tall (i.e., taller than 150
centimetres). Now, note that
JY |p0K = {X1 +X2 : 100 ≤ X1 ≤ 150, X2 ∈ [−10, 10]}
= [90, 160],
JY |p1K = {X1 +X2 : 150 ≤ X1 ≤ 250, X2 ∈ [−10, 10]}
= [140, 260].
Thus JY |p0K ∩ JY |p1K = [140, 160]. Let T be a test such
that T (Y ) = p0 if Y ∈ [90, 150] and T (Y ) = p1 if Y ∈
(150, 260]. Evidently, T is a consistent test. We get
P(T ) = loge(µ(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K))
= loge(µ([90, 140) ∪ (160, 260]))
= loge(150).
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Fig. 2. Communication structure between a sender and a hypothesis-testing
adversary.
Further, note that h0(Y ) = loge(170). If we scale the
performance by h0(Y ), we get
P(T )− h0(Y ) = loge(150)− loge(170) ≈ −0.1251.
Now imagine the case where X = (X1, X2) ∈ [100, 250]×
[−20, 20] with the interpretation that the amount of the
additive uncertain measurement noise is twice larger. In this
case, we have
P(T )− h0(Y ) = loge(150)− loge(190) ≈ −0.2364.
This shows that, by increasing the amount of the noise, the
confidence of the test is reduced, which is in line with our
expectation. C
III. NON-STOCHASTIC PRIVACY AGAINST
HYPOTHESIS-TESTING ADVERSARY
Consider the communication diagram in Figure 2 between
a sender and an adversary. The adversary’s ultimate aim is to
accurately test a hypothesis H based on the communicated
information from the sender Y . The sender wants to provide
a message Y that is as close as possible to X while making
the adversary’s task in testing the validity of hypothesis H
difficult. The policy of the sender is captured by the mapping
from X to Y , denoted by gY . We use the performance of
the adversary in testing the private hypothesis based on the
reported output Y to define a measure of privacy as
Priv(gY ) :=



h0(Y )− loge(µ(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K)),
Y is a continuous u.v.
H0(Y )− log2(|JY |p0K∆JY |p1K)),
Y is a discrete u.v.
(5)
Note that increasing Priv(gY ) implies that the size of
JY |p0K∆JY |p1K is decreased, thus degrading the perfor-
mance of any test employed by the adversary in light of
Theorem 2.
Definition 3 (ε-privacy): Policy gY is ε-private for some
ε ∈ (0,∞) if Priv(gY ) ≥ log(1 + ε). C
We need to balance privacy with utility, otherwise the
best policy is to report nothing (or to report at uncertain
variable that is unrelated to X). Therefore, we need to define
a measure of accuracy to balance against the privacy.
Definition 4 (ρ-accuracy): Policy gY is ρ-accurate for
some ρ ∈ (0,+∞) if supX∈JXK ‖X − gY (X)‖ ≤ 1/ρ. C
Increasing ρ in ρ-accuracy implies that supX∈JXK ‖X −
Y ‖ is decreased, thus improving the quality of the reported
output Y by enforcing it to stay consistently closer to X .
Theorem 3: Assume that JXK ⊆ Rnx , and g : Rnx−1 →
R exists such that
gH(x) =
{
p0, xi − g(x−i) ≥ 0,
p1, xi − g(x−i) < 0,
where x−i = (xj)j 6=i. Let
gY (x)=



(g(x−i), x−i), g(x−i)−
1
ρ
≤xi≤g(x−i)+
1
ρ
,
x, otherwise,
and
ε=


exp(h0(X))
µ
(
JXK∩
{
x : g(x−i)−
1
ρ
≤ xi ≤ g(x−i)+
1
ρ
})−1


−1
.
Then, gY is ρ-accurate and ε-private. C
Proof: See [42].
For large enough ρ, it can be seen that JXK∩{x : g(x−i)−
ρ−1 ≤ xi ≤ g(x−i) + ρ−1} ≈ {x : g(x−i) − ρ−1 ≤ xi ≤
g(x−i) + ρ−1}, and, as a result, ε = O(ρ−1). This implies
that, for the policy in Theorem 3, we have
“privacy× accuracy = constant”.
With the theoretical results in hand, we can demonstrate the
effects of using the policy in Theorem 3 on a practical dataset
in the next section.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this subsection, we consider design of a privacy-
preserving policy for reporting individuals height in cen-
timetres and weight in kilograms publicly. We consider
an adversary who is interested in identifying individuals
passing the obesity threshold in terms of body mass index
(BMI), e.g., an insurance agency may use publicly available
data to increase premiums of obese people or deny them
insurance. Therefore, there is a duty of care when releasing
demographic data of individuals publicly. By the definition of
the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, a person,
be it female or male, is considered obese if their BMI is
greater than or equal to 30.
Let uncertain variable X denote the weight and height,
i.e., X = [X1 X2]> with X1 ∈ [0, 200] denoting the
weight in kilograms and X2 ∈ [0, 250] denoting the height
in centimetres. The hypothesis is
gH(x) =



p0,
x1
(x2/100)2
≥ 30,
p1,
x1
(x2/100)2
< 30.
Following the notation of Theorem 3, we can re-define the
hypothesis using the sign of x1 − g(x2) with g : x2 7→
Fig. 3. Privacy guarantee, ε, versus accuracy level, ρ. The dashed line
shows the asymptotic O(ρ−1).
30(x2/100)
2. Define
gY (x) =



30
( x2
100
)2
,
3x22
1000
− 1
ρ
≤ x1 ≤
3x22
1000
+
1
ρ
,
x1, otherwise.
(6)
Note that
µ
(
JXK ∩
{
x : g(x−i)−
1
ρ
≤ xi ≤ g(x−i) +
1
ρ
})
=
∫ 250
0
∫ min(3x22/1000+1/ρ,200)
max(3x22/1000−1/ρ,0)
dx1dx2
=
∫ 250
0
[min(3x22/1000 + 1/ρ, 200)
−max(3x22/1000− 1/ρ, 0)]dx2.
Using this, we can compute the level of privacy guarantee.
The solid black line in Figure 3 illustrates privacy guarantee,
ε, versus accuracy level, ρ. The dashed line shows the
asymptotic O(ρ−1). As expected, by increasing accuracy, the
privacy guarantee can only be reduced and vice versa.
Now, we use a real dataset to investigate the effects of
the privacy-preserving policy in (6). We use a dataset of
preferences, interests, and demographics of young people,
aged between 15-30, of Slovakian nationality [44]. The data
was gathered in 2013 by students of an statistics class
at FSEV UK through friends and families. The dataset
consists of 1,010 records with 150 features (139 integer and
11 categorical) including height, weight, music preferences,
eating habits, etc. This dataset is popular for analysis on
Kaggle (an online platform for sharing data) with 99.4k
views and 21.8k downloads on all continents within the last
three years. Noting that the preferences of the individuals
can be matched with publicly available datasets, such as
IMDb (Internet Movie Database), to potentially identify the
individuals, there is a need for obfuscating the data in order
to avoid privacy breaches related to age, weight, and height.
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Fig. 4. The histogram of the reported weight and hight of individuals for various levels of accuracy, ρ. The darker colors show higher frequencies.
in centimetres. The hypothesis is given by
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Following the notation of Theorem 3, we can redefine the
hypothesis using the sign of x1 − g(x2) with g : x2 %→
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Note that
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=
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0
∫ min(3x22/1000+1/ρ,200)
max(3x22/1000−1/ρ,0)
dx1dx2
=
∫ 250
0
[max(3x22/1000 − 1/ρ, 0)
− min(3x22/1000 + 1/ρ, 200)]dx2
Using this, we can compute the level of privacy guarantee.
The solid black line in Figure 3 illustrates privacy guarantee,
ϵ, versus accuracy level, ρ. The dashed line shows the
asymptotic O(ρ−1). As expected, by increasing accuracy, the
privacy guarantee can only be reduced and vice versa.
Now, we use a real dataset to investigate the effects of
the privacy-preserving policy in (6). We use a dataset of
preferences, interests, and demographics of young people,
aged between 15-30, of Slovakian nationality [40]. The data
was gathered in 2013 by students of an statistics class
Fig. 4. The histogram of the reported weight and height of individuals for various levels of accuracy, ρ. The darker colors show higher frequencies.
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Fig. 5. The blue curve illustrates the difference of the mean value of the
weight of the population with and without the privacy preserving policy.
The red curve shows the difference between the empirical density functions
of the weight across the population with and without the privacy preserving
policy, measured by the Kullback–Leibler divergence.
at FSEV UK through friends and families. The dataset
consists of 1,010 records with 150 features (139 integer and
11 categorical) including height, weight, music preferences,
eating habits, etc. This dataset is popular for analysis on
Kaggle (an online platform for sharing data) with 99.4k
views and 21.8k downloads on all continents within the last
three years. Noting that the preferences of the individuals
can be matched with publicly available datasets, such as
IMDb (Internet Movie Database), to potentially identify the
individuals, there is a need for obfuscating the data in order
to avoid privacy breaches related to age, weight, and height.
Assume that we use the policy (6) is used for reporting
weight and height of individuals so that potential future
insurance agencies cannot test for the obesity levels. Figure 4
illustrates the histogram of the reported weight and hight
of individuals for various levels of accuracy, ρ. The darker
colors show higher frequencies. As expected, by decreasing
ρ, the accuracy gets worse; the histogram changes more
drastically. The blue curve in Figure 5 illustrates the dif-
ference of the mean value of the weight of the population
with and without the privacy preserving policy. The red
curve in Figure 5 shows the difference between the empirical
density functions of the weight across the population with
and without the privacy preserving policy. These curves
allows a data curator to balance between privacy and utility.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We considered privacy against hypothesis testing adver-
saries using the theory of non-stochastic hypothesis test-
ing. We constructed reporting policies with prescribed pri-
vacy and utility guarantees. We demonstrated the utility of
privacy-preserving policies on a real dataset. Future work
can focus on development of optimal policies.
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Fig. 5. The blue r f the ean value of the
weight of the po lati t ri preserving policy.
The red curve sh s t t irical density functions
of the weight across t it t the privacy preserving
policy, easured t .
Assume that we use the policy (6) is used for reporting
weight and height of individuals so that potential future
insurance agencies cannot test for the obesity levels. Figure 4
illustrates the histogram of the reported weight and hight
of individuals for various levels of accuracy, ρ. The darker
colors show higher frequencies. As expected, by decreasing
ρ, the accuracy gets worse; the histogram changes more
drastically. The blue curve in Figure 5 illustrates the dif-
ference of the mean value of the weight of the population
with and without the privacy preserving policy. The red
curve in Figure 5 shows the difference between the empirical
density functions of the weight across the population with
and without the privacy eserving policy. These curves
allows a data curator to balance between privacy and utility.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We considered privacy ag inst hypothesis testing adv r-
saries using the theory of non-stochastic hypothesis test-
ing. We constructed reporting policies with prescribed pri-
vacy and utility guarantees. We demonstrated the utility of
privacy-preserving policies on a real dataset. Future work
can focus on development of optimal policies.
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